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The reader unfamiliar with my development of García Landa’s model and its
symbols is advised to pay a preliminary visit to the Appendices. In the body of
this paper I shall limit myself briefly to stress the relevant points and proceed to
dwell on what, following García Landa, I shall call the hermeneutic package
governing every single act of speech production and comprehension, and which
interlocutors must share in order successfully to understand each other.
The essentials of my development of García Landa’s model
García Landa 1990 and 1998 understands communication through speech as the
production of speech perceptions that he calls linguistic percepts (symbolised as
LPs2). Let me remind us what he means: what a speaker means to say, his
vouloir dire or meaning meant, comes to his conscience as a linguistic percept
intended (LPI), that is, as it were, an “amalgam” of propositional and pragmatic
content moulded by and articulated as speech. Such perception of what a person
wishes to communicate to himself or others does not come from nowhere or for
no reason at all: it is always the product of a conscious motivation governed by
the speaker’s unconscious as a certain orientedness towards his addressee3
(which I symbolise respectively as W and Z) governing a main and a host of
secondary pragmatic intentions (Yy). It is always a function of a complex system
                                                          
1 Updated version of the paper submitted to the international seminar Training
Translators and Interpreters: New Directions for the Millennium, Vic 12-15 May
1999.
2 In previous pieces (Viaggio 1998, 1999a, 1999b and 1999c), I followed García
Landa’s own use of his acronym for espacio perceptual hablístico (EPH), which he
has now abandoned.
3 I borrow this term from Toolan 1996, who defines it as what any two people
minimally require to understand each other. I stress here that kind of mutual
orientedness which is inaccessible to the person’s conscience, since what he is aware
of can be subsumed in his conscious motivation.
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of relevant encyclopaedic entries or general pre-comprehension schemes (K)4,
which are indispensable for understanding. Such a speech perception is
normally couched in units selected from, and articulated according to, the
different virtual systems of the same language; although it need not necessarily
be the case.
Following García Landa5, I find it convenient to distinguish four main
elements within the linguistic chain: 1) its phono-morpho-semantic structure,
governed by a certain virtual system L; 2) its semantic potential, governed by its
own virtual system H; 3) its prosodic structure, governed also by its own virtual
system R; and 4) its register Q6 – one of several possible such registers. Thus,
knowledge of L, H, R and Q equals knowledge of the global linguistic system
(or subsystem) governing a specific utterance. This is not to be assimilated to
the traditional, intuitive view: L, H, R and Q may correspond to a hybrid lect
such as Spanglish or Creole, or any specific dialect or sociolect of a given
“language”. People who have trouble with teen talk or professional jargons can
be said to be basically H-deficient, whilst students who know English but find
that they cannot understand the Irish or Australian “accents”, for instance, lack
enough knowledge of the phonic component of the relevant L, and possibly also
R. In this light, it stands to reason that an interpreter who is called upon to
understand and eventually reproduce well nigh automatically all manner of
geographical, social, professional and other lects must have a whole repertoire
of the relevant subsystems of the hyper- or arch-systems L, H, R and Q of what
we somewhat sloppily and a-critically call, for instance, the Spanish or English
language.
That with respect to language. As we know, utterances do not float in
timeless ether – nor are they produced or understood by isolated brains7. To
                                                          
4 K stands, inter alia, for Malmkjaer’s passing theories, Seleskovitch and Lederer’s
savoir partagé, or whatever it is that any two or more people need to understand
each other’s LPIs.
5 In his versions of 1990 and 1998, García Landa had not yet included prosody. On
my part, I have added register.
6 As pointed out above, the virtual linguistic systems according to which an utterance
is articulated may or may not be that of a single “language”. More often than not,
people, especially non-native speakers – or translators and interpreters vulnerable to
interferences from the original language – will mix or combine the phono-morpho-
syntactic, semantic or prosodic systems of one language with those of another. It
takes the mother to grasp the incipient still somewhat amorphous versions of the
relevant systems her child is applying in its efforts to communicate through speech
(in this respect, we can posit that mother and child share a unique code
hermeneutically accessible to them alone).
7 The above applies both to interpersonal communication and to inner speech, i.e. to
the speaker communicating with himself - except that in order to make this meaning
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begin with, every act of speech is produced in a specific social situation
governed by a more or less structured or loose, tacit or explicit, rigid or flexible
system of more or less institutionalised practices, norms, rules and beliefs P8.
And it is also governed by a system of specific, thematic and otherwise ad hoc
knowledge, which García Landa calls its relevant world M; this applies as much
to a formal meeting as to an interview with a social worker or a casual
encounter. Mutual knowledge of these practices (most particularly of what
Hatim 1997 calls “sociotextual” practices) and relevant world are also essential
for communication to succeed. Thus, whilst K is the general extra-linguistic
baggage people resort to for their myriad exchanges, P and M are the situation-
specific elements of the hermeneutic package. (In the hermeneutic package you
are applying in order to understand this paper, dear reader, K and M overlap
almost completely – except perhaps for the intrusion of the unconscious,
imported from psychoanalytic theory, i.e. from K to M.) This distinction
between P and M on the one hand, and between M and K, on the other (all of
which, in actual fact, constitute a continuum with the other components of the
hermeneutic package) serves the methodological purpose of distinguishing
general from thematic knowledge, and thematic knowledge from the social
norms pertaining to a given situation. From a different perspective, the
Hallidayan notions of tenor and field parcel this continuum somewhat
analogously: what is more relevant to this model (since it is not explicitly
identified as a crucial element of P) is tenor – the power relations between the
different interlocutors, most particularly in the case of judicial and community
interpreting.
At the other end of this social process, applying at the same time
retroactively and prospectively to the semiotic stimulus the filter of his own
conscious (U) and unconscious motivation to understand (which, in order for
comprehension to succeed, must of necessity be attuned to the speaker’s,
wherefore both are symbolised as Z), and applying his own general pre-
comprehension schemes and knowledge (which, again, in order for
                                                                                                                                
meant accessible to others, the speaker cannot but reduce it to some kind of sensorial
stimulus. García Landa and I are not interested in this stimulus’s physical
configuration as differences in air pressure or in its neurophysiological production or
processing, but stress rather its semiotic, i.e. social essence and linguistic,
paralinguistic and kinetic configuration as it is produced by the speaker in a specific
social situation. By reducing simultaneous interpretation to a neurophysiological and
cognitive process taking place as it were in a social vacuum, Gile’s efforts model
ignores, precisely, the mediating effort: the assessment of the social situation and the
aptest communicative strategies that it calls for. A good interpreter is doing more
than simply comprehending, manipulating memory and producing utterances.
8 Searle’s notion of “background” can be roughly assimilated to P.
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comprehension to succeed must coincide with those of the speaker’s, whereby
both are symbolised as K), the listener perceives meaning meant as a new
“amalgam” of propositional and pragmatic content moulded by and articulated
by speech. This García Landa calls comprehended linguistic percept or LPC, i.e.
meaning understood – a perception that is the cognitive and pragmatic product
of speech comprehension9, which in turn produces in the subject of
comprehension specific a main and a series of secondary contextual effects (Aa)
– cognitive, pragmatic and even aesthetic. García Landa postulates that
communication has been successful if and only if meaning meant as perceived
by the speaker and by the listener are identical, i.e. if they are perceptions of the
same social object, which in our case is always defined as an intended or
comprehended LP10. Such identity can be empirically verified, if at all, at trivial
levels; We assume that it must be – and historically has been – achievable often
and effectively enough for the species to perceive, talk about, fight over and
otherwise act upon the same world and thus survive through collective
intentionality (Searle 1995). Even when communication fails, we can become
aware of it and think, speak and eventually remedy any mismatch in our mutual
perceptions of each other’s meaning meant. Together, K, P and M constitute the
extra-linguistic half of the hermeneutic package. It is useful perhaps to explain
why I think that Z has a place – and a most decisive one at that – in my
development of García Landa’s model. This role is better described negatively:
communication cannot be successful if the unconscious resistance to be
understood or to understand is such that no amount of conscious effort will help
- those of you who are married need no further proof.
Motivations, intentions, and effects
May I interpolate that if, as I have noted, speech acts are not produced in a
social vacuum or for no reason at all, they are not without social consequences
either: the subject of the comprehension experiences specific contextual effects.
Strictly speaking communication can be said to have pragmatically succeeded if
                                                          
9 Speech comprehension – the mostly spontaneous and immediate seizure of meaning
meant – is, of course, but the first Peircean semiosis (see Gorlée 1994) produced
through the hermeneutic package. Understanding that the plumber is telling us that
we should change the pipes requires nothing beyond such an immediate semiosis.
Further semioses may lead us to understand that he is cheating us, that he cheats
because of some kind of psychological trauma, and so forth ad infinitum (the subject
is specifically discussed in Viaggio 1999b).
10 The distinction is methodologically convenient, but in actual fact, even the speaker’s
perception of what he means to mean is the result of a comprehension process. Only
what we comprehend is accessible to our conscience: LPI’s can only be postulated.
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the pragmatic effects of comprehension match the speaker’s pragmatic
intentions (i.e. when an argument meant to convince actually convinces), but
that is seldom the case. Pragmatic success can be more modestly described as
the absence of obvious failure, i.e. when co-operation by one of the interlocutors
is not inordinately weakened or cancelled by pragmatic obstacles (irritation and
boredom most notably included). In any event, the mediator must be aware that
sometimes perceptual identity (LPI=LPC) does not go hand in hand with
pragmatic success – even as so modestly defined. Of course, unless his loyalty
lies squarely with the speaker, the mediator cannot take “pragmatic” sides; yet,
in principle, it is nevertheless his duty to help avoid or minimise any
unintentional mismatch between motivations, intentions and effects - i.e.
between W and Yy on the one hand, and U and Aa on the other. It is up to him to
determine the relative importance of LPI/LPC identity with respect to pragmatic
adequacy. By pragmatic adequacy I mean an adequate correlation between the
speaker’s motivations and intentions and the addressee’s motivations and the
effects that comprehension has upon him. The mediator has as his fundamental
pragmatic task to determine (and establish) relevant LPI/LPC identity. Such
relevant identity may well be “minus,” as when propositional content deemed
socially irrelevant or, worse, pragmatically counterproductive in the new
situation is altogether omitted by the mediator; or it may be “plus”, as when
information is added; or it may be “zero”, as when information is substituted, for
instance in the case where an untranslatable or pragmatically inept joke is
substituted with another. If the achievement or avoidance of certain pragmatic
effects becomes the main mediating task, as is normally the case at the
beginning of exchanges, when the interlocutors are simply breaking the ice and
establishing the grounds for co-operation, then propositional identity is totally
subordinate to pragmatic adequacy.
Except in the most obvious cases, such as humour, many practitioners,
especially in simultaneous conference interpreting, overlook the relative weight
of the pragmatic component in communication and mediation. Trainers have
thus the task to instil in the new generations a more modern, scientific, global
view of mediation as “translation plus", i.e. as not merely translation, but of
translation that is pragmatically adapted to the social needs of mediation. As we
have seen, mediation may sometimes become “translation minus” and even “non
translation”. But this is the subject of another paper. Let us go back to the
subject in hand.
The hermeneutic package
It seems obvious that linguistic knowledge on its own is never enough to infer
an LPI (i.e. to get a relevantly identical LPC from any semiotic chain, whatever
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its degree of explicitness). Successful communication (both at the elocution and
comprehension poles) requires an adept application of the general and specific,
encyclopaedic, thematic and cultural knowledge that governs speech production
and perception, fostered rather than impeded by the interlocutors’ conscious and
unconscious sensitivity and predisposition. Resorting to the model’s parlance,
we can therefore describe successful communication as a function of the
linguistic and extra-linguistic hermeneutic package both consciously and
unconsciously applied by either interlocutor in an act of speech. In order to
succeed, communication necessitates of both interlocutors an adequate
application of knowledge of the linguistic systems L, S, H, and Q, of the world
at large K, and of the social practices and norms P and relevant world M
governing a specific social situation, fostered by a positive unconscious mutual
orientedness Z - or at least unfettered by excessive resistance. If this is so, it
stands to reason that communication cannot succeed unless both the speaker and
the addressee share this hermeneutic package. Any mismatches are bound to
hamper or altogether prevent communication. This is crucial for the mediator: it
is up to him to remedy or minimise, in so far as objectively and deontologically
possible, any such mismatches. Successful mediated communication depends on
the mediator’s adroit application of an adequate hermeneutic package in his
double role as pole of comprehension in the original speech act and pole of
production in the second one.
The hermeneutic package’s didactic significance
It ought to be a truism that translation in general and interpretation in particular
begin with having understood and end in having succeeded to communicate.
This requires, of course, an adequate innate subjective predisposition, both
emotional and cognitive that must be instilled and developed - students must be
taught to think as translators and interpreters. In this respect, then, I submit that
teaching translation and interpretation must begin by teaching how
communication through speech works, what the conditions that must necessarily
obtain are, how to determine that they are in fact in place, and how to help
institute them or at least palliate their absence if they are not. In other words, the
would-be translator or interpreter must himself understand what understanding
is, and learn how to achieve it and promote it effectively. All our collective
complaints about our students’ lack of passive language knowledge and active
language competence, general culture and analytic capacity can be reduced to a
single hyper-problem: a precarious and flimsy hermeneutic package, full of
glaring holes and dangerously loose ends, sloppily applied. It also goes without
saying, on the other hand, that expertise at understanding specific people and
making oneself understood by specific people in specific circumstances, despite
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linguistic, cultural, psychological, political and other barriers, demands
intellectual and experiential maturity: one cannot really expect to come across
truly competent mediators at a very young age. This essential maturity
requirement has lead to the widespread assertion that interpretation should be a
postgraduate academic endeavour. Indeed, if simultaneous interpretation is
taken for what it really is, namely the most demanding form of mediated
intercultural interlingual communication from the cognitive and
neurophyisiological point of view, then there is no reason why interpreters
should be churned out in two to four years by the hundreds, with no intercultural
experience, and both existentially and intellectually immature. But then there is
no reason either for them to have to acquire such maturity studying something at
best marginally relevant to mediating: if physicians and lawyers are not
expected to mature elsewhere in academia, why then interpreters? Let
interpretation be a postgraduate course at a school of interlingual intercultural
mediation, not just an afterthought to other pursuits.
That having been said, whatever the human material that may befall us, it is
clear that our task can only begin to succeed if we manage to equip our students
with a minimally adequate hermeneutic package – or, rather, help them acquire
it on their own – and impart to them a minimally competent skill at applying it.
This requires, above all, developing the habit of methodical analysis, i.e.
teaching a hermeneutic method (with discourse analysis firmly rooted at its
centre). In this, our main obstacle lies in the contra natura essence of
translational comprehension. A mediator, by definition, is dealing with
communication not addressed to him, in which he is not directly interested,
either cognitively or, worse, emotionally. The main difference between a direct
interlocutor and a mediator, then, lies in their respective attitude towards what is
being said. We must teach our students to listen and read as if they were
personally interested in the pragmatic and cognitive effects of comprehension.
Unless these basic elements are reasonably in place, there is simply no hope that
in whatever real or imaginary social situation pertaining at the moment, meaning
as understood by the student will be relevantly identical to the speaker’s
meaning meant.
Then comes the second part. This meaning meant that is not meant for them
and about which they tend not to give a hoot, our student must now transmute
into their own meaning meant – except that this new LPI must now be
articulated in the target language. The turn has come for the student to make
himself understood – not in general, not in the abstract, but by a specific if
imaginary audience (about which the student probably does not care a hoot
either) endowed with their own adequate or inadequate hermeneutic package,
which they will apply more or less competently or willingly, in part as a function
of their own interests in or resistance to the contextual effects of having
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processed the stimulus provided by the mediator. Now, our student must speak
as if he had his own personal stake in what he is saying, i.e. in the speech act
that he initiates. As any other speaker, he too cannot but have a conscious
motivation, governed by an unconscious motivation, governing in turn a main
and a host of secondary pragmatic intentions. He must simply try and attune
them to his function as professional mediator. At this point, his active
competence to produce all manner of suitable linguistic utterances in the target
language becomes indeed decisive – but not much more than his ability to assess
the audience’s hermeneutic capability and willingness to co-operate, without
which communication between him and them cannot succeed. Unless these
complementary hermeneutic and heuristic competencies are reasonably in place,
there is little chance a) that the student will have understood the speaker, b) that
he will have adequately transmuted meaning understood into meaning meant,
and c) that he will then manage to convey his meaning meant relevantly, i.e. in
such a way that it can be properly and effectively understood by his audience
without unnecessary or unjustified processing effort; so that e) his audience will
end up relevantly understanding the meaning meant by the speaker . This, alone,
is what successful mediation is about11 – namely, bringing about relevant
identity between the speaker’s LPI and the addressee’s LPC.
Let me explain once again what I mean by relevant identity: 1) Rarely if ever
do the motives that prompt a speaker to produce and verbalise a speech
perception match the motives that move a listener to pay attention and try to
understand it. To boot, in mediated interlingual communication not only is there
by definition a total or at least partial absence of a shared linguistic hermeneutic
package (otherwise why the need for a mediator?) but, more decisively, even if
co-operation is fully in place, rarely if ever do the respective extra-linguistic
hermeneutic packages overlap enough for full comprehension to be possible - or
mutually relevant. The last and most difficult task to be taught and learnt is,
precisely, that of mediating between people who, however bent on
understanding each other, lack crucial elements of the hermeneutic package that
makes such understanding possible, and, besides, have no fully shared
assessment of relevance.
How can a simultaneous interpreter – let alone a student – reach such a level
of hermeneutic analysis and heuristic prowess... in the 250 odd milliseconds that
equals real time in simultaneous interpretation? The model I propound here, I
submit, helps visualise and stake out the road. This is, I think, its pedagogical
                                                          
11 In our view, there is little point in researching speech comprehension and production
in translation or interpretation per se, as if it were a different animal. Rather, what
translation and interpretation do indeed offer a researcher is a unique window into
speech-related and cognitive processes and anomalies that are normally inaccessible
in non-translational speech.
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usefulness, and on this basis I proceed to suggest that a particular approach be
tried out.
A new pedagogical approach
The difficulty that comes immediately to mind when speaking about conference
interpreting is the most apparent (but not, I dare venture, the fundamental one):
that of medium- and short-term memory for consecutive interpretation, and of
short-term memory and real time (including the overlapping of speech
comprehension, processing and production) for simultaneous interpreting.
Consecutive interpretation does not pose this latter contra natura problem (and,
as such, it is cognitively “easier”), but introduces its own: the artificially long
separation between comprehension and production (whereby it becomes
cognitively more difficult)12. The only kind of interpreting that is free from both
anti-natural demands is dialogic interpretation (the only form of mediation that,
within the limitations of a person’s hermeneutic package, can be performed
“naturally”), whence its limited training value… Unless, of course, the
hermeneutic asymmetry is stressed, which demands an “unnatural” stretching of
the student’s hermeneutic package and its heuristic application. This, I submit,
could well be the most adequate beginning for professional training, of both
interpreters and translators. If neurophysiologically simultaneous interpretation
is the most demanding form of mediated intercultural interlingual
communication, and if consecutive interpretation is the form that most
unnaturally taxes medium-term memory and demands a new auxiliary,
potentially distracting mnemonic technique, what about learning first to mediate
interlingually and interculturally without additional “unnatural” demands and
limitations? Only once the essence of mediating is more or less assimilated does
it make sense to make it neurophysiologically more complicated. It should not
take inordinately long.
It bears pointing out that there is a crucial difference in the way the
hermeneutic package needs to be accessed by the interpreter and the translator:
real time. If the translator normally has enough time to access – and extend – his
linguistic and extra-linguistic knowledge as he is translating, i.e. by interrupting
his work, what the interpreter cannot remember there and then is as good as non-
existent – or worse. Often, awareness that he knows, say, a word or term that
refuses to come to mind will distract an interpreter from the task in hand,
whether it be understanding or speaking. That is why training, especially of
                                                          
12 Which, by the way, should be a decisive argument against making consecutive an
eliminatory step before simultaneous, unless the problems lie in an obvious
hermeneutic inanity rather than in memory or note taking.
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simultaneous interpreters, must pay particular attention to increasing the
immediate, automatic accessibility of a rich and systematically organised
hermeneutic package.
Some suggestions
In the light of the facts discussed above, may I put forward some basic
suggestions that might improve interpreter training:
1) Stress from the very beginning and at all stages that mediating involves, on
the one hand, the mediator’s pragmatic and cognitive hermeneutic ability to
identify relevance a) for the speaker, b) for the speaker’s original addressees
(individually and collectively), and c) for his, the mediator’s, own addressees
(again, both individually and collectively). It also entails his heuristic
competence to produce an optimally relevant series of speech acts himself,
so that he can reasonably assume that within the subjective and objective
limitations inherent to any act of interlingual intercultural mediation
optimum relevant identity may be obtained in the end between the
perception that a speaker wishes to convey and what the interpreter’s
interlocutors perceive13.
2) Obviate any unnecessary complications due to the chronological distance or
overlap of both speech acts and the reification of speech through writing
until an apt hermeneutic method is basically in place (again, this should not
take too long). At the same time, pull speaker and interlocutor culturally and
socially further apart, thus honing the student’s mediating abilities.
3) Proceed to simultaneous interpretation with a clear awareness that a
student’s ability to comprehend and produce speech must compete and
overlap with his ability to mediate effectively.
                                                          
13 It is worth noting that, barring the totally un-hermeneutical clozing (which may,
perhaps help detect psycho-motor ability, though I doubt it very much), all the
exercises I know of are hermeneutically oriented one way or another. As I see it
clearly now, the common aim of all the ones I have suggested myself, from
abstracting and condensing (Viaggio 1992b) to active inferring (Viaggio 1996a),
through cognitive clozing (Viaggio 1992a) and sight translation (Viaggio 1995), and
of my views on kinesics (Viaggio 1997) or the difficulties of metalingual use in
simultaneous interpretation (Viaggio 1996b), has been systematising and developing
the hermeneutic package and fostering its application – except that until fairly
recently I lacked a unifying model that could shed systematic light on all these
different skills as applied to understanding LPI’s in one language and facilitate their
verbalisation in a new language as a function of the new hermeneutic package to be
applied by the interpreter’s interlocutors.
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Conclusion
Let me stress the obvious corollary of the model: communication theory as
applied to mediated intercultural interlingual communication together with its
simplest and most glaring and accessible application – dialogic interpretation,
should be taught at the very beginning. Unless the mediating essence of
interpretation has been fully assimilated, it is premature to try and develop the
specific cognitive and motor skills that distinguish consecutive or, especially,
simultaneous interpretation from other forms of mediation. I, for one, find it
unrealistic to teach simultaneous interpretation as an alternative to translation. It
should come at the very end of a full relevant academic experience in mediated
interlingual intercultural communication. As most of us advocate, selection at
this stage must be fair and realistic: few students have the required congenital
cognitive and motor disposition (like musicians or mathematicians, interpreters
and translators are born after all!). I hope that my development of García
Landa’s model may help set priorities right: ontologically and by the degree of
neurophysiological14, cognitive and social complexity and difficulty of the tasks
in hand. One thing, I submit, is certain: barring the mnemonic and psychomotor
techniques specific to consecutive and simultaneous interpretation, the didactics
of interlingual intercultural mediation boils down to getting students to develop
their hermeneutic package, and to access and heuristically apply it ever more
aptly and automatically.
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APPENDIX 1
The Garcia Landa Models as Developed by Viaggio
a. The model of the act of speech (a general model of verbal communication)
García Landa’s models of verbal communication and translation (initially
formulated in his 1978 doctoral thesis and published in 1990 and 1998) are, to
my knowledge, the most comprehensive, refined and rigorously formalised to
date. In consultation and co-operation with him, I have developed and
synthesised them into a mediation model. The versions discussed below are the
latest. In its present form, the model of (successful) communication can be
summarised as follows:
1) Every act of speech D (whether oral V, written T, or interiorised I) in a given
language o is a social transaction whereby someone (the subject of
production), out of a conscious motivation W, governed by an unconscious
predisposition to communicate Z, with a main pragmatic intention Y and
secondary pragmatic intentions y, wishes to communicate a perception LPI5
which is a function of a given set of pre-comprehension schemes, knowledge
base or passing theories K.
2) To that effect, he sets in motion a complex mental operation which involves
mainly constructing and presenting to his interlocutor(s) a finished social
product which is a sign chain F in language o. Such a chain consists of a) a
phono-morpho-syntactic structure X (actualising a certain phono-morpho-
semantic system L); b) a semantic potential S (actualising a semantic system
H); c) a rhythmico-prosodic structure V (actualising a rhythmico-prosodic
system R); and d) a register J (from a register series Q). This chain is also
necessarily accompanied by a series of suprasegmental (paralinguistic or
typographical) features C, and kinetic or graphic features E that reinforce,
nuance or modify its sense. (In written and face-to-face oral communication,
then, the stimulus triggering the comprehension process consists of three
components: F, C and E, although the last one is lost in strictly acoustic
communication such as radio, telephone, etc., often making comprehension
more difficult.)
3) The speech act is carried out in a given social situation or socio-historical
field G governed by a shared system of beliefs, norms and practices, or a
certain shared life and personal experience P, within a given relevant world
M, at a historic moment VH, and, within that moment, at a specific time t.
(All components are characterised by specific set of features m, n, etc.).
4) Someone else (the subject of comprehension, who more often than not is the
same person playing both roles, i.e. communicating with himself), is
listening and understanding in a complex mental operation which results in
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his producing a perception LPCo, which is also a function of the same
knowledge base K. In order to do so, he must build upon or overcome his
conscious motivation or resistance U and be in turn governed by an
unconscious predisposition to communicate Z. We should stress the active
nature of comprehension, whereby the comprehender (re-)constructs his
speech perception of the speaker’s meaning-meant retro-applying his own
filters U, Z and K to the acoustic/optic stimulus [FCE]. Comprehension,
moreover, produces upon him a main and secondary pragmatic effects Aa,
which may or may not correspond to the speaker’s intentions.
The key notion is that, whether written or oral, literary or not, a speech act is
much more than its verbalised vehicle - which is, itself, more than its sheer
linguistic chain. Resorting to the symbols alone (where > indicates
determination, • production and • • production through retro-projection; the
mantissas represent the events and phenomena taking place in real space/time
and the exponents the virtual systems or structures gravitating upon them) verbal
communication is then formulated as:
D(V/T/I)o: WZ > Yy > LPIKo •
Fo(XmL,SmH,VmR,JmQ)CmEm]GPMVHtm •• UZ > LPCKo • Aa
Communication will have succeeded if:
GPM (LPIo [=] LPCo)
b. The interlingual intercultural mediation model
The truly expert interpreter, of course, does more than merely re-produce a
speech perception: he mediates, he shuttles between the speaker’s lips and the
addressee’s ears, modifying or altogether disregarding certain elements as a
function of his own skopos. The mediator takes such “liberties” because he is a
human being involved in speaking, as opposed to a machine receiving one code
through its keyboard and producing another on its display. In this liberty lies the
heuristic nature of his activity. As has often been said, the translator does not
find equivalencies, he creates them each time he comes up with a verbalisation:
an Fi which is the product a) of his comprehension of the LPIo – his LPCo (the
hermeneutic part of his task), and b) his analysis of the new communicative
situation (K, G, P, M, VHt, UZ). Such an analysis may well lead him to modify
even the intention or function of the original speech act. We are, in fact, still
dealing with identity, except that now our aim is not so much global
propositional and pragmatic identity but relevant identity, i.e. the necessary
degree of perceptual identity (and it may be zero) that allows for the relevant
correlation (NB, not necessarily correspondence) of the speaker’s and the
mediator’s pragmatic intentions, on the one hand, and the contextual (cognitive
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and pragmatic) effects of comprehension on the other. On the basis of this
relevance, the mediator operates a transmutation of LPCo into LPIi and
produces his new chain Fi with all manner of trans-formations. Between what he
has understood as comprehender of the LPIo and what he decides to convey as
verbaliser of his LPIi lies the essence of the interpreter’s mediating activity: by
transforming he exercises both his deontologically responsible freedom and his
loyalty.
In symbolic notation, the model of interlingual intercultural communication
would look like this:
Do: WZ > Yy > LPIoK • [Fo(XmL,SmH,VmR,JmQ)CmEm]GPMVHtm ••
UZ > LPCoK • Aa [•]
Di: [•] WZ > Yy > LPIiK • [Fi(XnL,SnH,VnR,JnQ)CnEn]GPMVHtm +
n •• UZ > LPCiK • A
Where the symbol [•] stands for the adaptation that the mediator operates
between LPCo and LPIi. Mediation succeeds when, within a given objective
situation influenced by subjective emotional and cognitive factors, relevant
perceptual identity [=] is established between what the speaker wishes to
convey and what the interlocutor understands:
GPM (LPIo [=] LPCi)
This is, then, an ideal model of what may be heterofunctional/heteroscopic
mediation, which posits as a felicity condition a relevant identity between LPIo
and LPCi. Thus, it serves also as a quality standard, harmonising description and
prescription: unjustified, avoidable deviations from global identity can be
deemed to be methodologically wrong. To my mind, our model’s uniqueness is
that it assimilates and dialectically develops all relevant attempts at defining and
explaining translation (dynamic equivalence, théorie du sens, skopostheorie,
etc.) encompassing and accounting for all of the relevant factors identified so
far. Another advantage is its symbolic notation, which makes it possible to
represent the relevant notions and their relationships directly and graphically, so
that no time is wasted discussing names and definitions, which is the social




The Symbols and their Definitions
W Conscious motivation governing elocution.
Z Unconscious mutual orientedness governing both interlocutors.
Y Main pragmatic intention.
y Secondary pragmatic intentions.
U Conscious motivation or resistance governing comprehension.
A Main pragmatic (or contextual) effect.
a Secondary pragmatic (or contextual) effects.
LP Speech perception - articulation of the propositional and affective
content through speech.
LPI Intended speech perception - what the speaker means to convey.
LPC Comprehended speech perception - what is perceived by the
comprehender.
K Relevant knowledge and pre-comprehension schemes.
D Speech act - V oral, T written, I inner, L reading.










Q Possible registers (it is a moot point whether registers constitute a
system).
C Paralinguistic (elocutional) o perilinguistic (typographic) configuration.
E Kinetic or graphic configuration.
G Socio-historic field.





n, m Specific characteristics.
> Determination.
• Unidirectional production.
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•• Bi-directional production (retro-projection by the comprehender on the
sensorial stimulus of his motivation/knowledge and its projection on
the speech perception).
= Perceptual identity.
[=] Relevant perceptual identity.
[•] Transmutation by the mediator of the comprehended perception into
intended perception (the basis of relevant identity).
